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vs . 
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Defendant-Cross-Appellant/ 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
OHIO CASUALTY DID NOT VOLUNTEER TO INDEMNIFY 
AGAINST ANY FRAUD, ONLY FRAUD INVOLVING 
MOTOR VEHICLES 
Shelter America has advanced the absurd proposition that 
the motor vehicle dealer's bond covers any fraud committed by 
Dewey & Bob's. Shelter America suggests that the meaning of 
"motor vehicle" is therefore irrelevant. According to this 
logic, if Dewey & Bob's had fraudulently sold real estate or 
issued fraudulent checks, the loss would be covered. Ohio 
Casualty supposedly volunteered to provide such coverage. 
To support this argument, Shelter America omits part of the 
controlling clause, disregards the remainder of the controlling 
sentence and ignores the entire context of the bond. Even 
strict construction against the surety does not require the 
bond to be rewritten to give it a meaning that was plainly not 
intended. When the bond is viewed as a whole, the only 
rational interpretation is that the bond only covers fraud 
involving motor vehicles. 
Rather than quoting the precise language of the bond, 
Shelter America rephrases that language to suit its argument. 
On page 4 of Respondent's Brief, Shelter America contends that 
the bond covers "any loss suffered by reason of fraud or fraud-
ulent representation." This is not what the bond says. The 
bond says that there is indemnification for "any loss suffered 
by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made." The 
words deleted by Shelter America give the clause a different 
meaning. These words connect the clause to the rest of the 
sentence by referring to the fraud, not just any fraud. 
When the entire clause is put in the context of the 
remainder of the sentence, it becomes clear that the fraud 
referred to is fraud involving motor vehicles. The sentence 
requires the principal to conduct his business as a motor 
vehicle dealer in compliance with the Motor Vehicle Business 
Act. The statute required that Ohio Casualty specifically 
mention fraud or fraudulent representation in its bond. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-3-16 (1981). The remainder of the bond 
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also confirms that the fraud referred to is fraud involving 
motor vehicles. The title of the bond is "Bond of Motor 
Vehicle Dealer or Salesman" and the preamble to the bond is 
that the principal has applied for a license to do business as 
a motor vehicle dealer. 
To give the bond the meaning argued for by Shelter America 
is to disregard the context in which fraud is mentioned. This 
is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation. See Utah 
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). The 
interpretation advanced by Shelter America also requires an 
actual deletion of some of the language of the bond. Strict 
construction against the surety aside, the principles of con-
tract interpretation require that all words of a contract be 
given some meaning. Presumably the drafter did not include 
words which were intended to be ignored. 
The language of the bond simply does not support Shelter 
America's contention that Ohio Casualty volunteered to cover 
any fraud. Under all of the applicable rules of interpreta-
tion, Ohio Casualty's bond should be interpreted to cover the 
fraud or fraudulent representations made by the principal in 
his business as a motor vehicle dealer, but the bond should not 
be interpreted to include all other kinds of fraud the princi-
pal may have committed. 
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POINT II 
THE PRIMARY INTENDED USE OF A MOBILE HOME IS 
FOR RESIDENCE, NOT FOR TRAVEL ON THE PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY 
The parties agree that a mobile home does not fall within 
the statutory definition of motor vehicle unless a mobile home 
is "a vehicle intended primarily for operation on the public 
highways." Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16. Shelter America argues 
that a mobile home satisfies this definition because it is 
equipped with a trailer hitch, wheelbases and taillights and is 
therefore intended to be drawn on the public highways by a 
motor vehicle. Ohio Casualty does not dispute that a mobile 
home is designed to be drawn on the public highways; but, that 
is not the test set forth by the statute. The question is 
whether that is the primary intended use. 
The fallacy of Shelter America's argument is demonstrated 
by its own reference to automobiles. Shelter America submits 
that many automobiles spend little time on the public highways 
and might therefore not be considered intended primarily for 
operation on the public highways. Shelter America points out 
that many automobiles spend a great deal of time simply parked 
in garages. Herein lies the fallacy. When an automobile is 
off the public highways it is not being used. Hence, its pri-
mary use remains operation on the public highways. By con-
trast, a mobile home is being used when it is parked. In fact 
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that is when it is being used most fully. An automobile sits 
cold and dark when not on the highways, whereas, a mobile home 
is used by its residents as a shelter. Shelter is the primary 
intended use of a mobile home. The mobile home is intended to 
travel on the public highways, but only so that the mobile home 
can be transported from one location to another. This trans-
portation is not the primary use of a mobile home. 
Thorp Finance Corp. v. Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 
(1965) demonstrates the proper analytic approach notwithstand-
ing any difference between the mobile homes in this case and 
the dwellings in Thorp- Although the dwellings in Thorp may 
have been somewhat more permanent in their design, design was 
not the touchstone of the Court's decision. The Court affirmed 
the lower court's judgment for the following reason: 
We think the trial court took the only reasonable and 
realistic interpretive approach by saying that the 
primary purpose of the movement of these units was not 
to use our highways but to plant the units terra firma 
wise to accommodate two small families, with two 
separate entrances and facilities. 
Id. at 207-08 (emphasis in the original). The same is true 
here. The purpose of moving modern-day mobile homes is not to 
use the highways, but to relocate the mobile homes for use as a 
shelter in another location. Shelter, not transportation, 
remains the primary intended use of a mobile home. For this 
reason, this Court should conclude that the mobile homes are 
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not "motor vehicles" as that term is defined in the Motor 
Vehicle Business Act, Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7(1) (1981). 
This Court's decision in Consolidated Finance Corp. v. 
Moulton, 25 Utah 2d 416, 483 P.2d 450 (1971), did not reach the 
question now before the Court. There the action against the 
surety was dismissed because the plaintiff's claim was for 
breach of contract, not for fraud. This Court only assumed and 
did not decide whether the house trailer involved in that case 
was a motor vehicle. 
POINT III 
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT REQUIRE THIS COURT TO 
MODIFY THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES TO INCLUDE MOBILE HOMES 
Shelter America argues that even if mobile homes are not 
technically within the definition of motor vehicles, this Court 
should include them within that definition for public policy 
reasons. Such an amendment of the statute is not dictated by 
public policy, nor is it an appropriate exercise of judicial 
power. 
Shelter America relies on the fact that two state agencies 
have treated mobile home as motor vehicles; however, that is 
not an appropriate public policy consideration. In Thorp v. 
Wright, supra, this Court rejected the very same argument. 
There the plaintiff argued that the house trailers involved in 
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that case should be treated as motor vehicles. This Court 
declined to give the Tax Commission's interpretation any 
import. Id., at 208. By doing so, this Court put the Tax Com-
mission and other state agencies on notice that, contrary to 
agency interpretation, house trailers do not fall within the 
definition of motor vehicle. Had those agencies or the 
legislature itself wanted to change that definition to include 
mobile homes, there were many opportunities to do so between 
the 1965 decision in Thorp and 1977 when Ohio Casualty's bond 
was issued. 
In truth, the Utah Code treats mobile homes separately. 
They are subject to the Mobile Homes and Recreational Vehicles 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-20-1 through 7 (1981). That Act 
requires mobile homes to be certified as in compliance with the 
applicable plumbing, heating, electrical and fire prevention 
standards. Had the legislature chosen to make mobile home 
sales subject to the protections against fraud, it could have 
easily done so. It is not the role of this Court to make the 
determination for the legislature. 
Shelter America further contends that it is unworkable for 
this Court to ask state agencies as well as the public to make 
a distinction between mobile homes and motor vehicles. In 
reality the difference is not all that difficult. Most con-
sumers know whether they are shopping for something to trans-
port them on the highways or for something to provide them with 
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shelter and a place to live. Motor homes and recreational 
vehicles might provide a closer call; however, these classifi-
cations have already been made by the Motor Vehicle Administra-
tion as is demonstrated by the various license classifica-
tions. Further, if the state agencies did not change their 
practice after this Court's decision in Thorp, there is no 
reason to believe they will find it necessary to change their 
practices if this Court affirms Thorp by concluding that 
modern-day mobile homes are also not motor vehicles. 
POINT IV 
WHETHER THE MOBILE HOME FRAUD WAS SUFFI-
CIENTLY RELATED TO DEWEY & BOB'S MOTOR 
VEHICLE BUSINESS TO FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
COVERAGE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW. 
In Point I, Part C of Shelter America's Respondent's Brief, 
Shelter America argues that its claim is sufficiently related 
to Dewey & Bob's motor vehicle business to be covered even if 
mobile homes are not motor vehicles. As will be argued, Ohio 
Casualty considers this argument to misconstrue Betenson v. 
Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (1982); how-
ever, this argument should not even be considered by the court 
because it was not raised in the lower court. 
Below Shelter America opposed Ohio Casualty's motion for 
summary judgment below for all the reasons stated in Point I, 
Parts A and B of its Respondent's Brief. Even the headings of 
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the arguments are identical. See Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Table of Contents. 
However, the related activity argument was not raised in any 
other memoranda submitted by Shelter America nor was it raised 
in oral argument. Shelter America's failure to raise this 
argument below precludes this Court's consideration of it for 
the first time on appeal. See Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986); Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 
639 P.2d 214 (Utah 1981) . 
Further, even if this court considers Shelter America's 
argument, the argument should be rejected. The fraud either 
involved motor vehicles or it did not. Shelter America miscon-
strues Betenson v. Call Auto, 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982). 
Betenson found that "coverage under the bond exists only for 
activities constituting the conduct of the dealer's business 
'as a dealer,' or for activities which the dealer has repre-
sented as part of his business 'as a dealer.'" Id. at 687 
(emphasis added). Hence, the activities must actually con-
stitute part of the dealer's motor vehicle business, not simply 
be related to that business. Under Shelter America's analysis, 
Ohio Casualty would be liable if Dewey & Bob's had sold fake 
diamonds from a counter at its place of business. The rule 
proposed by Shelter America unnecessarily blurs the line 
between motor vehicle activities and other activities of the 
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motor vehicle dealer. The bond is only required and was only 
written to cover the dealer's motor vehicle business. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons as well as those stated in Ohio 
Casualty's initial brief, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the ruling of the lower court and rule 
that Ohio Casualty is not liable to Shelter America in any 
amount. 
DATED this Z>* day of December, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
'M. Berry 
Johrj/X. Lund 
rrneys for Cross-Appellant/ 
Respondent Ohio Casualty and 
Insurance Company 
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